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THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND
WHAT THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT
FOUND THERE
DALE D. GOBLE*
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather
scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean-neither
more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make
words mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be
master-that's all."'
On occasions courts play at Humpty Dumpty's semantic game. In
the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion upholding the legislative
veto,' the word is not "glory"-which Humpty Dumpty contemptu-
ously informed Alice meant "a nice knock-down argument"-but
"law."s
I
In 1985, the Board of Health and Welfare adopted septic tank reg-
ulations pursuant to a delegation of rulemaking authority from the
* Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. I would like to thank a
number of my colleagues for their comments on earlier drafts of this article-but they
won't let me.
1. L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE IN
ALIcE IN WONDERLAND, 101, 163 (Norton Critical ed. 1971) [hereinafter L. CARROLL].
2. A "legislative veto" is an assertion of the power by a legislative body to void
("veto") administrative agency regulations or other actions through the use of proce-
dures other than the enactment of a statute. The process employed in Mead v. Arnell,
117 Idaho 660, 791 P.2d 410 (1990), is an example. I.C. § 67-5218 asserts the power to
adopt "a concurrent resolution ... rejecting, amending or modifying" any agency regu-
lation. Since a concurrent resolution is not presented to the governor for his approval or
rejection, it does not comply with the constitutional requirements for enacting a statute.
The Idaho Constitution requires not only the bicameral adoption of a bill, IDAHO CONST.
article 3, § 1, but also presentment to the governor for his concurrence or veto, id. article
4, § 10. As the court recognized, "HCR-29 [the concurrent resolution at issue] is not a
law." Mead, 117 Idaho at 667, 791 P.2d at 417.
3. See Mead, 117 Idaho 660, 791 P.2d 410 (1990).
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Idaho Legislature. Four years later, the Idaho Legislature by concur-
rent resolution declared the regulations to be "null and void and of no
force and effect."" By that time, more than 11,000 septic tank permits
had been issued. The Board refused to comply with the veto resolution,
concluding that it was unconstitutional. One district health depart-
ment, however, acquiesced in the legislature's directive to reinstate the
pre-1985 regulations. The Board responded by petitioning the Idaho
Supreme Court for a writ requiring the district to adhere to the vetoed
regulations. 5
The court adopted John Marshall's gambit in Marbury v.
Madison.6 It upheld the constitutionality of the veto on the ground
that the legislature could repeal the regulations without enacting a
"law" because the regulations themselves were not "law." Nonetheless,
the court ordered the district health department to comply with the
Board's 1985 regulations because it concluded that the legislature had
failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for employing the veto.7
4. H.R. Con. Res. 29, 1989 Idaho Sess. Laws 1095.
5. See generally Mead, 117 Idaho at 661-62, 791 P.2d at 411-12.
6. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Although Marshall eventually held that the Court
lacked jurisdiction over the action, he did so only after deciding that Marbury was enti-
tled to his commission and, therefore, President Thomas Jefferson and Secretary of
State James Madison had acted illegally in withholding it. See generally Van Alstyne, A
Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DuKE L.J. 1.
7. The court concluded that the statute imposed "threshold requirements that the
legislature definitively express that the rule being rejected is contrary to legislative in-
tent." Mead, 117 Idaho at 670, 791 P.2d at 420. Since the concurrent resolution did not
include such a finding, the court held that it did not satisfy the statutory requirements
and was therefore without effect. Id. at 671, 791 P.2d at 421.
This aspect of the decision is also perplexing. The legislature either has the consti-
tutional power to void agency regulations or it lacks that power; a statute cannot affect
its authority. That is, if the legislature has the constitutional power to veto an agency
regulation, that power cannot be circumscribed by a previous legislature. Since a statute
does not amend the constitution, no legislature can affect the power of its successors
simply by enacting a statute. On the other hand, if the legislature lacks the constitu-
tional power to void agency regulations, the legislature and the governor cannot give the
legislature additional powers by enacting a statute. The legislature derives its powers
from the constitution and it can neither increase nor decrease those powers by stat-
ute-otherwise there would be no constitutional limits on legislative power. Thus, if the
legislature has the constitutional power asserted in I.C. § 67-5218 to void agency regula-
tions, compliance with the statutory provisions is not necessary because the resolution is
effective in its own right. If the legislature lacks the constitutional power to veto the
regulations, a statute cannot confer that power on the legislature and I.C. § 67-5218 and




A central element of the deep constitutional structure of American
government is the requirement that a legislature may change the legal
rights or obligations of individuals only through a constitutionally pre-
scribed method: enacting a bill with the concurrence of the chief execu-
tive or passing it over his objections with a supra-majority. This
proposition is so fundamental that precedent for it is almost necessa-
rily inferential since that which is assumed is seldom litigated.' None-
theless, the caselaw that does exist is 'suggestive. For example, when
the Idaho Legislature attempted by resolution to increase the salaries
of state employees9 or to relinquish rights in land to private claim-
ants,10 the Idaho Supreme Court held that the legislature had exceeded
its powers and required it to proceed through a bill. Similarly, the
court has recognized in a variety of contexts that this constitutionally
required method is one of the important checks and balances adopted
by the drafters of the state constitution to prevent potential abuse of
power by one branch of government."
In the instant case, the legislature's veto of the regulations
changed the legal rights and obligations of individuals. On March 27,
1989, an individual wishing to install a septic tank was required to
comply with certain standards or to face legal sanctions. On March 29,
an individual seeking to install the same system was required to com-
ply with different standards or to face legal sanctions. The different
requirements resulted from the resolution voiding the agency's 1985
regulations and reinstating the 1978 regulations. That resolution
sought to change the legal obligations of individuals, subjecting them
to sanctions for conduct previously legally permissible-something that
the constitution requires to be accomplished by enacting a bill with the
concurrence of the governor.
8. The United States Supreme Court struck down the legislative veto in part be-
cause the veto "had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and rela-
tions of persons . .. outside the Legislative Branch." Immigration & Naturalization
Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983). This rationale tends to be lost, however, in
the Court's otherwise extremely formalistic separation-of-powers analysis.
9. Griffith v. Van Deusen, 31 Idaho 136, 169 P. 929 (1917); Hailey v. Huston, 25
Idaho 165, 136 P. 212 (1913).
10. Balderston v. Brady, 17 Idaho 567, 107 P. 493 (1910).
11. E.g., Idaho Power Co. v. State, 104 Idaho 570, 661 P.2d 736 (1983); Halley v.




Although the Idaho Supreme Court's discussion of the constitu-
tional issue is often jumbled and repetitive, it is ultimately both sim-
ple-and entirely semantic.
The court begins with the proposition that "only the legislature
has the power to make 'law.' "12 The legislature may, however, create
administrative agencies and authorize them to promulgate regulations
having "the 'force and effect of law.' "1, This distinction-between
"law" and things that only have the "force and effect of law"-is the
whole of the analysis: the court repeatedly emphasizes that administra-
tive regulations are not "law" because "[o]nly the legislature can make
law."M4
The argument thus resolves itself into a semantic stroll through
the looking-glass; since regulations are not "law," the concurrent reso-
lution vetoing them did not change the "law." Since the resolution did
not change the "law," the resolution was not itself "law," and therefore
the legislature was not required to comply with the constitutional com-
mand that "law" be made through bicameral adoption of bills that are
approved by the governor. 5
IV
The court has produced a Jabberwocky opinion: from even a
purely semantic perspective, "'Twas brillig, and the slithy toves/ Did
12. Mead, 117 Idaho at 664, 791 P.2d at 414. The court relies upon three provisions
of the Idaho Constitution in asserting this threshold proposition: article 2, § 1 provides
that the "powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct depart-
ments" and prohibits members of one department from exercising "any powers properly
belonging to either of the others"; article 3, § 1 specifies that "[t]he legislative power of
the state shall be vested in a senate and house of representatives"; and article 3, § 15
states that "[n]o law shall be passed except by bill." It is apparent that the constitu-
tional provisions do not necessitate the court's conclusion, but only the less expansive
proposition that the legislature's method of making law is through a "bill." Furthermore,
the legislature does not act alone in making "law" since the constitution requires that
the governor be involved.
13. Mead, 117 Idaho at 664, 791 P.2d at 414. The court's insistence that only the
legislature can make "law" and that other governmental entities create things that have
only the force and effect of law leads to the question of whether it is now proper to speak
of the "common force-and-effect of law" rather than the "common law." Are torts and
contracts no longer law?
14. Id. See generally id. at 664-66, 791 P.2d at 414-16.-
15. "HCR-29 is not a law and need not comply with article 4, § 10 of the Idaho
Constitution." Id. at 667, 791 P.2d at 417. See generally id. at 667-68, 791 P.2d at 417-
18. Bicameral adoption of all bills is required by article 3, § 15 and article 4, § 10; pre-
sentment to the governor is mandated by article 4, § 10.
[Vol. 27
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gyre and gimble in the wabe." As Alice said of the original, "Somehow
it seems to fill my head with ideas-only I don't know exactly what
they are!""
A bill adopted by both houses of the legislature and signed by the
governor, a judicial decision establishing or rejecting a new common
law principle," and a regulation promulgated by an administrative
agency-each has the same effect. One may call the various actions
"law," "things with the force and effect of law," or "tu-tu,"'  but
whatever term or terms are chosen, their identical effect should be ap-
parent: legal obligations are altered through the formal actions of a
governmental entity.
Between October 15, 1985-when the regulation became fi-
nal-and March 28, 1989-when the senate concurred in the veto reso-
lution and it became final-Idaho residents were obligated to act in
certain ways or face legal sanctions. On March 28, 1989, the legislature
sought to change those legal obligations. The constitution requires this
to be accomplished only by enacting a bill with the concurrence of the
governor.19
V
The court is, of course, correct that administrative regulations "do
not rise to the level of statutory law."20 It is also correct that the au-
thority to promulgate regulations is based on "a delegation from the
legislature [rather than] a constitutional grant of power to the execu-
tive." But the court's semantic distinction between "law" and some-
thing that has the "force and effect of law" but is not itself "law"
16. L. CARROLL, at 116, 118.
17. E.g., Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, 293 Or. 543, 544-45,
652 P.2d 318, 319-20 (1982).
18. See Ross, Tu-tu, 70 HA~v. L. REV. 812 (1957).
19. A comparison of the language delegating rulemaking authority to the agency
and the language of the concurrent resolution demonstrates the practical politics of the
legislative veto. The Environmental Protection and Health Act of 1972 authorizes the
director"to issue pollution source permits in compliance with standards and procedures
established by the board of [health] and welfare." I.C. § 39-115 (1985). The Act itself,
however, contains no standards, merely delegating authority to the agency without ap-
parent limits. The concurrent resolution purporting to void the septic tank rules, on the
other hand, specifies that the agency is to repromulgate the regulations "taking into ac-
count such factors as climate, depth of the water table, where the systems will be in-
stalled, monetary hardship and other relevant factors." H.R. Con. Res. 29, 1989 Idaho
Sess. Laws 1095. The veto resolution thus sought to amend the delegation of rulemaking
authority by providing actual standards for the first time.
20. Mead, 117 Idaho at 664, 791 P.2d at 414.
21. Id. at 665, 791 P.2d at 415.
1990-91]
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obscures the actual differences between legislature and statutes, on the
one hand, and agency and regulations, on the other. The fundamental
distinction is the difference between a dominant, essentially unlimited
power and a subordinate, restricted one.
The Idaho Legislature has all powers it is not prohibited from ex-
ercising by the United States or Idaho Constitutions.2 2 Its decisions are
not subject to review or revision by another legislative body. Adminis-
trative agencies, on the other hand, lack these attributes. An agency is
a creature of statute rather than constitution and thus lacks any inher-
ent power to change legal obligations; an agency may promulgate regu-
lations only when the legislature has authorized it to do so by enacting
a statute. Similarly, the agency's authority to regulate is restricted by
the scope of the power delegated to it. Finally, the legislature retains
the unlimited power to enact a bill amending or repealing the dele-
gated authority. Thus, as a creature of statute, an agency remains sub-
ject to the legislature.
Acknowledging this paramount, largely unlimited power says noth-
ing about the method that the legislature must employ to control its
creation-and it is precisely because the legislature's power is so un-
limited that compliance with the constitutionally mandated method of
using that power is so critical.
VI
On the other side of the looking-glass, words can be given any
number of meanings; it makes little difference. All that is required is
that like Humpty Dumpty the court gives them a bonus when they
22. E.g., Idaho Power & Light Co. v. Blomquist, 26 Idaho 222, 241-42, 141 P. 1083,
1088 (1914). This is one reason why the court was properly unmoved by federal separa-
tion-of-powers precedents. See Mead, 117 Idaho at 667-68, 791 P.2d at 417-18. State
governments differ fundamentally from the national government. Most significantly, the
national government is a government of enumerated, albeit expansive, powers. Unless
affirmatively authorized by the United States Constitution, the national government may
not act. State governments, on the other hand, have all powers not affirmatively denied
to them. Thus there is no need for a list of the subjects of state legislative power similar
to that contained in article 1, § 8 of the national constitution. Similarly, the state judici-
ary is the repository of all judicial authority-unlike the national judiciary which is em-
powered to decide only certain cases and controversies. Finally, the national executive
power is vested in a unitary office, the President. State executive power, on the other
hand, is divided among several independently elected officials: the Governor, Lieutenant
Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, and Auditor. Such fundamental differ-
ences make federal separation-of-powers law an uncertain guide at best. The United
States Supreme Court's decision invalidating the legislative veto is thus entitled to a
respectful audience rather than automatic acceptance.
[Vol. 27
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come round to collect their pay on Saturday night.28 On this side of the
looking-glass, however, words often affect people at the most mundane
level-in establishing standards for the construction of septic tanks,
for example.
23. L. CARROLL, at 164.
1990-91]
